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ABSTRACT: This study analyzes the negative performance of Calabria’s Regional 
Program 2000-2006, for the enhancement of cultural goods to attract tourism, as an ex-
ample of the waste of resources in the regional planning under the EU-Italian complex 
planning procedure for economic convergence. The empirical analysis shows that the va-
riables relating to cultural sites, education sites and sites with tourism or tourism poten-
tialities had no significance or even negative influence. The most significant variable was 
the number of nonprofit organization present in the municipalities. A relevant part of the 
funds remained unspent for the purposes of the plan, and it was devoted to other destina-
tions. After the program, the number of visitors and revenues from museum and archeo-
logical sites of Calabria is lower than before, while on average in Italy there was a great 
increase. On the other hand, tourism in Calabria experienced a differential increase, in 
spite of the waste of the funds of the European regional policy. 
KEYWORDS: cultural goods; tourism; public policies; public expenditure; South-
ern Italy. 
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1. Introduction 
This study analyzes the negative performance of Calabria’s Regional Op-
eration Program (POR) 2000-2006. The program was devoted to 
projects for the enhancement of cultural goods to attract tourism, as an 
example of a waste of resources in the European Union’s ambitious pro-
gram 2000-2006, for the economic convergence of Europe’s less devel-
oped regions with the developed ones (Community Support Framework, 
2000-2006). The results of Calabrian POR, performed following the 
guidelines of the Council Regulation No. 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999, 
and of the related Italian Development and Plan, have been negative. 
The funds of 231 million Euro, which would activate a similar amount of 
co-financing, have been dispersed throughout the territory in 546 
projects. Notwithstanding, the meticulous selection procedures used to 
establish the projects (many of those approved) resulted in significant in-
efficiencies: a large share of the projects were abandoned before comple-
tion, resulting in just 63% of the funds allocated being spent. Despite the 
scale of resources mobilized (nearly 450 million of Euro in a region with 
2 million of residents) both the flow of visitors to the cultural sites and, 
more generally, that of tourists to Calabria have not been enhanced. We 
show, by statistical analysis, how the variables that determined the alloca-
tion of the funds have been incoherent with the proclaimed objectives of 
valorization of cultural patrimony and the touristic promotion. 
The study is divided in eleven sections. Section 2 provides a brief sur-
vey of economic literature on this issue. Section 3 provides background 
information on the POR 2000-2006 in Calabria. Section 4 gives an over-
view of the cultural heritage endowment of Calabria and of the imple-
mentation of the program. Sections 5 presents the econometric metho-
dology, the data set and the empirical results. Section 6 discusses some 
details of regression analysis. Section 7 demonstrates some statistical re-
sults about criminal hubs. Section 8 presents the impact of Calabria’s 
POR project on both culture and tourism. Section 9 discuss coherent 
projects. Section 10 gives the concluding remarks and policy implica-
tions. Section 11 makes suggestions for future researches. 
 
2. A survey of literature 
In spite of the optimistic reports of the European Community, (Com-
mission of the European Communities, 2009), in the literature on the 
European Regional Policies for less developed regions, those of the so-
called Obiective 1 (Cini, 2003; 2007) predominate the researches demon-
strating disappointing results. Some authors argue that the results are 
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poor in the case of regions with weak institutions and better in the other 
cases. However, the regions for whom the financial aid is justifiable are 
the less developed ones. And the weakness of the institutions is one of 
the main characters of the less developed regions belonging to advanced 
European countries. Basile, De Nardis and Girardi (2001) demonstrate 
that in spite of the huge amount of public aid to the poor regions of EU, 
the distribution of income, labour productivity and employment rates do 
not show a positive relation with the allocation of the EU structural re-
gional funds, particularly in the Nineties. Boldrin and Canova (2001), ar-
gue that to a large degree these policies operated primarily as a transfer 
of funds with redistributive or assistance purposes rather than serving as 
agents to simulate or increase growth. Puga (2002) observe that, in spite 
of the large expenditures on European regional policies, the disparities 
remained or even widened, mainly because of factors connected with the 
location theory so that more emphasis should be placed on improving 
transport structures. Rodriguez Pose and Fratesi (2003) show that the re-
turns to the investments in infrastructures and business support were not 
significant, and that only investment in education and human capital had 
positive and significant medium term returns. Ederveen, De Groot and 
Nahuis (2006) show that European structural funds were very largely in-
effective in reducing regional disparities, with the exception of the re-
gions were institutions are of a high quality. Bjorvatn and Coniglio (2006; 
2007) maintain that generally – not only in Europe – policies to promote 
regional development very often have disappointing results and also 
connect such results with the weakness of institutions. In this case tar-
geted policies create rents that attract rent seekers, so that broad-based 
policies would be more appropriate. The targeted plans should be 
adopted for the regions with strong institutions. The first part of the 
conclusion appears reasonable; nevertheless, the second part is uncon-
vincing. Indeed, where the institutions work well, it seems better to apply 
the general EU rules on competition, and leave to the market economy 
system the decision on which sectors can make best use of the subsidies 
supposedly given to compensate for the regional global externalities (Van 
der Beek, 2004). Eggert, von Ehrlich, Fenge and König (2007) analyze 
the impact of EU structural policy on the economic development of 
German regions between 1995 and 2004, arguing that the EU regional 
transfers speed up convergence, but have a negative impact on long run 
aggregate growth. Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg and Verspagen (2003) 
argue that EU regional policies had significant and positive impact on 
growth of less developed European regions, and that the effects are 
much better in a more developed environment. It follows that the sug-
gestion of improving the competence of the receiving environment ap-
pears rather naïve considering that the environment cannot be changed as 
long as the traditional social structures remain. Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger 
(2005) argue that the EU structural regional funds had a positive effect in 
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the case of the poorer countries such as Greece, and they add that the 
less “clean” countries (i.e. those more corrupt) did not gain less eco-
nomic growth from the structural funds. They add that many of those 
who receive the structural funds are not really eligible and therefore use 
them inefficiently. In the Italian economic literature – see Giannola and 
Imbriani (eds., 2003), Lo Cicero and Reganati (2003), Viesti (2003; 2009), 
Viesti and Prota (2009) – there is a widespread consensus on the fact 
that the Italian public interventions for the development of Southern It-
aly failed, in a large part, to reduce the disparities between Centre-North 
and South. There is also consensus that the Regional funds did not fulfill 
their objectives. This occurred both because due to the complexity of the 
procedures and to other factors, as a relevant share of the funds was not 
allocated before the time limit, and it was diverted to other end; more-
over, the share of the funds that was utilized under the prescribed pro-
cedures was not properly allocated. 
On the other hand, Loddo (2006) with a simplified econometric 
analysis argues that in Italy, in the period 1994-2004, the poorer regions 
have caught up with the richer regions, and that the European structural 
funds had a role in this convergence. However, agricultural funds had 
only a transitory positive effect, whilst the resources allocated had dubi-
ous effects from the distributional point of view and also for the support 
of employment, education and the human capital. But Vision & Value 
(2007) shows that in the period 2000-2001 the regions of Southern Italy 
featured in Objective 1 grew at a rate of 1.23% per year, while those of 
the Centre-North grew at a 1.24% rate, and EU-15 grew at the 1.96%. 
Similar results appear in Svimez (2009; 2010). While Cancelo, Faína and 
López-Rodríguez (2009) maintain that EU regional funds have been ef-
fective in promoting growth in the case of Galicia, a Spanish peripheral 
region in Objective 1. Borbalá-Szabó (2007) instead maintains that in 
Hungary the impact of the EU regional policies on economic growth 
have been disappointing. Ederveen and Gorter (2002), Edereveen, de 
Mooji, Gorter and Nahuis (2002), and Ederveen, de Groot and Nahuis 
(2006) provide an extensive econometric analysis to show mixed results 
both from the distributive and the growth perspectives, adding that the 
impact of these policies on national policies to reduce regional disparities 
has been negative. Tugores (2008), considering the EU-15 global macro-
economic results, concludes that the contribution of EU regional policy 
to the convergence among states is unquestionable for Spain, and it rep-
resented a factor for the Irish high growth. But that there has not been 
generally a narrowing among regions inside these states. The critical is-
sues are the possible distortions of the efficient assignment of resources 
and the risk that the resources placed at the service of cohesion may 
wind up in the hands of specific interests. 
For Krueger (1974) this point leads to the consideration of rent seek-
ing in terms of less developed economies, where rent seeking is the sub-
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stitute to the missing stimulus to profit seeking. On rent seeking in EU 
regional policies see also Bjorvatn and Coniglio (2006; 2007). Outside 
EU, for rent seeking as a negative phenomenon in regional policies, see 
Zaostrovtsev (2003) for Russia, Dreger, Rahmani and Eckey (2007) for 
Iran, and Fisher (2006) for Africa. Golley (2007) reaches mixed conclu-
sions on Chinese regional policies. For rich literature on rent seeking af-
ter the seminal works of Buchanan, Tullock and Niskanen see, more 
generally, for all Cogleton, Hillman and Konrad (eds., 2008). 
In the specialized economic literature on cultural goods and on tour-
ism there are several contributions that emphasize the importance of the 
cultural goods as attractors of touristic flows. See, for example, Goldoni, 
Rispoli and Troncon (eds., 2006), Colbert (2000), Kotler and Scott 
(1998), Nantel and Colbert (1992), Grossi and Debbia (eds., 1998), Dig-
gles (1986), Hirshmann (1983). More generally, see Forte and Mantovani 
(2004), and Cooper et al. (1998). 
The literature on the specific theme of this research – the Regional 
funds policies in the area of cultural goods and the development of tour-
ism in Southern Italy – is not equally developed; however see Forte, Ma-
gazzino and Mantovani (2010), Mantovani (2010), Spadaro (ed., 2010), 
Vision & Value (2007), and Ferrari and Cariola (2001). 
 
3. Structure of EU Regional Policy 2000-2006 and Calabria’s Oper-
ational Regional Program (POR) for cultural goods 
The European Regional Policy, for the 2000-2006 program, has been 
implemented through a complex planning procedure, carried on in a 
number of stages4, starting with Council Regulation No 1260/1999 of 21 
June 1999, laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds. Ac-
cording to this Regulation, article 9, the Regional Programs of each 
Member State should follow the guidelines set forth in a development 
plan prepared by that Member State in the light of the objectives referred 
to in Article 1 of the Regulation. This development plan should indicate 
the priority needs for attaining those objectives, together with the strate-
gy, the planned action priorities, their specific goals and the related indic-
ative financial resources. It follows that the Regional program should 
present the objectives individuated on the basis of the European Regula-
tion and of the national development program, and should set forth the 
priorities to attain these objectives, the strategy to reach them, the plan-
                                                 
4 According to Article 9 “programming: means the organizing, decision-making and fi-
nancing process carried out in a number of stages to implement on a multiannual basis 
the joint action of the Community and the Member States to attain the Objectives re-
ferred to in Article 1”. 
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ning actions priorities of the strategy and the specific goals, with the fi-
nancial resources allocated to them. The general objectives of this plan-
ning are presented in article 1 of the Regulation with emphatic language, 
as follows “the Community shall contribute to the harmonious, balanced 
and sustainable development of economic activities, the development of 
employment and human resources, the protection and improvement of 
the environment, and the elimination of inequalities, and the promotion 
of equality between men and women”. No clear priority emerges from 
this article. 
Cultural development in connection with tourism is explicitly consi-
dered by Regulation 1260/995, among the objectives of the European 
Regional policy. The regulations state: “Whereas cultural development, 
the quality of the natural and the man-made environment, the qualitative 
and cultural dimension of life and the development of tourism contri-
bute to making regions economically and socially more attractive in so 
far as they encourage the creation of sustainable employment”. Here too, 
the language is nebulous and without any indication of priorities. 
This task is devolved to the National Development Plan , which in 
the Italian case, for the less developed Regions consisted of QCS6 2000-
2006 approved with the Decision 2050 of the European Commission of 
July 1, 2000. According to the guidelines of this Plan, each Regional Pro-
gram of the Regions in Objective 1 should be divided into six axis: 
 
 Axis 1 - Enhancement of natural and environmental resources. 
 Axis 2 - Use of local cultural and historical resources. 
 Axis 3 - Human resource development. 
 Axis 4 - Expansion and enhancement of local systems development. 
 Axis 5 - Improving the quality of cities, local institutions and social life. 
 Axis 6 - Strengthening of networks and service nodes. 
 
The guidelines of QCS 2000-2006 for Axis 2 suggest that the South-
ern Italy Regional Programs should focus not only on the most impor-
tant cultural sites, but also consider the cultural patrimony diffused 
throughout the territory. Whilst this underlines the importance of cultur-
al goods for the development of touristic activities, it adds that the pro-
gram should also consider the cultural activities as such and “the entire 
cultural industry in the broad senses”. However indicators of actions 
present the capacity of attracting touristic consumptions, and as indica-
tors of results present the number of visitors to Museums. 
Calabria’s POR was approved by the Italian Government, in July 
2000, and gained the approval of the EU Commission with Decision 
                                                 
5 In paragraph 6 of the preliminaries to the articles. 
6 QCS means “Quadro Comunitario di Sostegno”, or “Communitarian Frame of Sup-
port”. 
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2345 of August 8 2000. For this POR, as for any other regional POR of 
Objective 1, 50% of the funds came from the budget of EU. Of this, 
nearly 60% of funds came from by European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF), which finances productive investment and infrastructure 
projects, with a further 20% from the European Agriculture Guidance 
and Development (EAGGF), and the remaining 20% of funds were ad-
ministered by the European Social Fund (ESF). A residual 0.94% of the 
EU funds came from Financial Instruments for Fisheries Guidance 
(FIFG). The remaining 50% of (non-EU) funds came from the finances 
of the receiving country, in this case Italy. A share of 80% was given by 
the Central Government, and the remaining 20% was provided by the 
receiving Regions and by local programs. Therefore Calabria contributed 
to the POR for 10% of its total funds. Private entities that presented 
projects had to be co-finance 50% of the cost of the project. Those pre-
sented by the public entities were totally financed by the POR. But these 
projects could have been part of broader projects financed for the re-
maining part by the public entity applying to the POR. 
Axis 2, which is the object of our research, had an European endow-
ment of 231 million Euro, and could mobilize additional Italian public 
finance resources of a similar amount, so that the total import of the 
public funds for the project would have been roughly 450 million Euro. 
It was subdivided in three “measures” pertaining to different kinds of 
projects, classified by their nature and by the subjects entitled to receive 
the funds. 
 
 2.1 Interventions for the preservation and valorization of cultural goods. 
 2.2 Public services for the valorization of cultural goods. 
 2.3 Development of entrepreneurial initiatives in these areas7. 
 
Measures 2.1 and 2.3 were administered by the Regional Department 
of Tourism because cultural goods were financed mainly as an attractor 
of tourism. 
The program, following article 9 of Council Regulations No. 
1260/1999, was constructed in a “gothic style”, by four goals, with five 
programmatic strategies for each goal and seven specific actions, each ar-
ticulated in a number of sub-actions. 
The four goals were described in an emphatic and vague language as 
follows: 
 
a) Construction of networks for the enjoyment of cultural and his-
torical heritage, in accordance with already planned network initi-
atives, and to identify meaningful property at the regional level 
                                                 
7 Project funds for development of entrepreneurial initiatives are granted within the 
limits of the de minimis rule. 
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on which to focus project resources in order to conserve, pro-
tect, and enhance. 
b) Generate managerial services of both public institutions and pri-
vate entrepreneurs to meet the demand of residents and tourist 
for cultural heritage resources. 
c) Qualify and support the training of technical and scientific fig-
ures tied to the heritage and cultural tourism sector, primarily for 
cultural management (organization of cultural institutions and 
utility companies) and management services for the dissemina-
tion of local knowledge (tour services). 
d) To Develop companies and organizations (public and private, 
profit and non-profit, cultural foundations) relating to the con-
servation, enhancement, and management of the development of 
services that combine the benefits of tourism with cultural re-
sources. 
 
Each of the four goals had to be implemented by the following pro-
gram strategies: 
a) Concentrating resources around cultural emergencies, identified 
as key exploitable resources. 
b) Enhance regional cultural identities through the wide range of 
arts, entertainment, and culture for social and economic devel-
opment. 
c) Provide the region with infrastructure resources, including “hori-
zontal” factors such a knowledge and training of cultural herit-
age. 
d) Create an interconnected function system to strengthen the cul-
tural whole (the network of archeological areas, coastal castles, 
regional libraries, etc.). 
e) Fostering entrepreneurship in innovated private management 
services. 
 
The five program strategies then had to be realized by seven types of 
actions. 
 
a) Enhancement of the archeological heritage of Ancient Greece. 
b) Establish a network of archeology of the Magna Graecia region. 
c) Create theme parks related to archaeological sites through the 
construction of adequate facilities for their use. 
d) Recovery, development, and reutilization of the most valuable 
elements of architectural and landscape heritage. 
e) Redevelopment of historic centers through the recycling of aban-
doned buildings. 
f) Construction of multipurpose centers for the integration of cul-
tural activities and entertainment. 
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g) Protection of the landscape through projects aimed at recovery 
and enhancement of the landscape. 
 
Each action had to take in consideration six sub-actions8. The sum al-
located to this was 231 million Euro, and considering that the amount of 
funds mobilized was nearly double, there was a large amount for the va-
lorization of the cultural patrimony of Calabria; but could hardly justify 
the complex articulation of the plan. From this clearly defined priorities 
did not emerge and the finely targeted economic plan became a discre-
tionary program without any priority. This program occurred on the ba-
sis that the Italian QCS 2000-2006 – following Council Regulation 
1260/99. And both the QCS and Calabria’s POR had the approval of the 
European Commission. The Italian Government and the EU, therefore, 
have been responsible of the fact that the regional bureaucracies and pol-
iticians could make discretionary choices, with support available in the 
cumbersome text of the POR. 
 
4. Overview of the cultural heritage endowment of Calabria and of 
program implementation 
Doubtless, Calabria is rich of cultural goods as many other Italian re-
gions. The Ministry of Artistic and Cultural Goods (MIBAC) maintains 
57 archeological sites on over 4,000 hectares of land with nine managing 
superintendants in the region. There are 19 museums of art, history, and 
important monuments of which only five require an admission fee. 
Among them is the National Archeological Museum of Reggio Calabria 
which has historically maintained the highest number of visitors. 
The majority of sites are in the provinces of Cosenza and Reggio Ca-
labria, with 14 and 12 sites respectively. In addition, there are 27 histori-
cally significant sites consisting of constructions in historical towns. Of 
them, 9 are still not officially protected. The remaining 18 historically 
significant sites – comprised of historical buildings and ruins – have been 
the object of registration for their protection. 
As mentioned above, the most important historical sites consisting of 
                                                 
8 The six sub-sections are:  
1. Promotion and implementation of innovative initiatives that enhance the cultural 
heritage and local identities. 
2. Events of significant cultural and anthropological value. 
3. Preservation of ethnic minorities who have maintained important features of the 
original cultures. 
4. Activities related to the ancient tradition of craft production, music, the produc-
tion of objects of culture of pastoral farmers, and local foods. 
5. Preservation of the oral traditions. 
6. Promotion and creation of cultural networks. 
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constructions. in Calabria are the “defensive systems” made of towers, 
fortresses and castles dating back to the Ninth century A.D. These tend 
to be located on hilltops and near the sea. There are 147 castles, 196 
towers, and 43 fortified structures officially recorded and protected. But 
only few of them are correctly preserved. 
Officially in Calabria there are 35 “theaters”: 80% of which are pri-
vately (non-state) owned. Of this, 50% are conducted by cooperatives, 
20% by associations, and the remaining 30% by private companies. The 
only culturally relevant theater is in Reggio Calabria. 
In some areas there are ethnic minorities (i.e. Albanians, Hellenistic, 
Occitan, and Gypsies) who have retained important features of their cul-
tures of origin. 
The multiplicity of cultural goods of Calabria may be disorienting. 
However it is easy to distinguish the most important of them, by refer-
ring to the national classification of the important museums, archeologi-
cal sites and monuments (inclusive of churches) done by the Ministry of 
Artistic and Cultural Goods. This classification may appears restrictive as 
for the historical buildings. We have broadened the list of the major cul-
tural sites of Calabria by including all the castles still preserved (see Table 
1). 
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Table 1 – Cultural Sites Considered by Municipality and Province. 
 Cultural Site Municipality Province 
1 Archeological Park of Scolacium BORGIA CATANZARO 
2 Archeological Museum 
of Lamezia (Neolithic) 
LAMEZIA TERME CATANZARO 
3 Norman Castle SQUILLACE CATANZARO 
4 State Archeological Museum AMENDOLARA COSENZA 
5 Archeological Park of Sibari CASSANO ALLO IONIO COSENZA 
6 Sibarite National Archeological 
Museum 
CASSANO ALLO IONIO COSENZA 
7 National Gallery of Cosenza COSENZA COSENZA 
8 Norman Swew Castle COSENZA COSENZA 
9 Antiquarium of Scalea – 
Torre Cimalonga 
SCALEA COSENZA 
1
0 
Norman Castle CORIGLIANO CALABRO COSENZA 
1
1 
Maritime Aragon Castle BELVEDERE MARITTIMO COSENZA 
1
2 
Swew Castle ROSETO CAPO SPULICO COSENZA 
1
3 
Pathirion ROSSANO CALABRO CROTONE 
1
4 
Nao Tower CROTONE CROTONE 
1
5 
National Archeological Museum CROTONE CROTONE 
1
6 
Le Castella ISOLA DI CAPO RIZZUTO CROTONE 
1
7 
Norman Castle SANTA SEVERINA CROTONE 
1
8 
Church of Saint Francis of Assisi GERACE REGGIO DI 
CALABRIA 
1
9 
Church of Saint Giovannello GERACE REGGIO DI 
CALABRIA 
2
0 
“Centocamere” Archeological 
 Area 
LOCRI REGGIO DI 
CALABRIA 
2
1 
Greek Roman Theatre LOCRI REGGIO DI 
CALABRIA 
2
2 
National Archeological Museum LOCRI REGGIO DI 
CALABRIA 
2
3 
Archeological Area MONASTERACE REGGIO DI 
CALABRIA 
2
4 
Leonida Repaci Cultural House PALMI REGGIO DI 
CALABRIA 
2
5 
Aragon Castle REGGIO DI CALABRIA REGGIO DI 
CALABRIA 
2
6 
Cilea Municipal Theatre REGGIO DI CALABRIA REGGIO DI 
CALABRIA 
2 National Archeological Museum REGGIO DI CALABRIA REGGIO DI 
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7 CALABRIA 
2
8 
The Catholic STILO REGGIO DI 
CALABRIA 
2
9 
Ruffo Castle SCILLA REGGIO DI 
CALABRIA 
3
0 
State Museum MILETO VIBO 
VALENTIA 
3
1 
National Archeological Museum 
“Vito Capialbi” 
VIBO VALENTIA VIBO 
VALENTIA 
3
2 
Norman Swew Castle VIBO VALENTIA VIBO 
VALENTIA 
3
3 
Murat Museum PIZZO VIBO 
VALENTIA 
3
4 
Murat Castle PIZZO VIBO 
VALENTIA 
3
5 
Cistercensis Convent SERRA SAN BRUNO VIBO 
VALENTIA 
Source: Forte and Mantovani (2004) with the cooperation of experts of the master 
in Archeology and architecture of the classic town, Mediterranean University of Reggio Cala-
bria, years 2009/2010. 
 
We have also added to the list the Lyric Theater of Reggio Calabria, 
the only important theater of the region and the cultural center entitled 
to Corrado Alvaro – Calabria’s most famous writer. 
A year after the expiration of the programs, the three Axes relating to 
culture achieved more success in comparison with the other axes of the 
POR, but they too were not satisfactory. Axis II has an allocation ratio 
of about 50% of the fund, as did Axis V (Social and City Life), and Axis 
VI (Networks). The program for natural and environmental resources 
(Axis I), for which Calabria has a natural vocation, has a ratio of only 
45%. Local systems for development (Axis IV) had a ratio lower than 
25% and human resources lower still at below 5%. 
At its accomplishment the Cultural POR allocated 63.4% of the avail-
able resources, with a share of the project finance abandoned before 
completion. We here consider the situation in 2007, as resulting by the 
official accounting at the end of February 2008, when 50% of the funds 
was allocated, and a further 46.3% was “committed”; of them, only 82% 
was really spent. The total amount committed was 197 million Euro, 
whilst the total amount spent was 157 million. 539 projects had been ap-
proved for execution, for each of these the average amount committed 
was 365,000 Euro, and each project on average received 291,000 Euro. 
Considering this, clearly there was a dispersion of funds in initiatives 
with a minimal impact on the valorization of Calabria’s important cultur-
al patrimony. 
There were only 3 projects exceeding 5 million Euro. They were for 
the two archeological parks of Solacium in Crotone and the plaster cast 
and picture gallery in Catanzaro. In the 3-5 million Euro category there 
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were four projects for the restoration of historic buildings and the struc-
tural adjustment of the National Museum of Cosenza, and as well as an 
appropriation 3 million Euro for the promotion of anthropological herit-
age. 
Only 25 projects approved had budgets from 1 to 3 million Euro. 
Among them, two projects for the preservation of the Albanian tradi-
tions and the creation of network designed to enhance minority languag-
es. Projects with a budget of 500,000 Euro were almost exclusively dedi-
cated to construction and restoration of buildings. 
Most projects were in the range between 1,000-250,000 Euro for the 
improvement of library systems, consolidation of buildings and 
churches, and the promotion of crafts in the process of “extinction” 
such as tailors, carpenters, goldsmiths. At the end of 2007, 60.7% of the 
total number of projects approved were incomplete. The complexity of 
the procedures and the fragmentation of the expenditure in small project 
resulted in a large proportion of unfinished projects, seven years after the 
beginning of the plan. And a share of them has been abandoned before 
the completion. 
 
Table 2 – Number of projects per Province. 
Province Number of 
projects 
Share of projects Share of 
population 
Cosenza 208 38.8 36.5 
Reggio Calabria 147 27.4 28.2 
Catanzaro 93 17.4 18.3 
Crotone 44 8.2 8.6 
Vibo Valentia 44 8.2 8.4 
Source: POR Calabria (2009). 
 
As one can see form Table 2, the distribution of the 536 projects by 
provinces follows closely the provincial distribution of the population, 
and so one can assume that the voting weight of each province deter-
mined the number of projects assigned to it. The fact that the Governor 
of the centre-right regional Junta in power until 2004 and the Governor 
of the successive centre-left Junta were respectively of the provinces of 
Cosenza (Chiaravalloti) and Catanzaro (Loiero) did not substantially af-
fect the distribution of projects by provinces. 
Nor was the distribution of funds among the provinces affected by ei-
ther the differing importance of their cultural goods, their ability to at-
tract tourism or their differing needs of valorization. Therefore, the crite-
rion that prevailed, among the provinces, was that of the distribution of 
the funds in proportion to their electors. 
 
5. Econometric methodology, data and empirical results 
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In this section we show statistical and econometric analysis results to 
shed light on variables that determined the POR 2000-2006 Axis II fund 
allocation. The dependent variables considered are the number of 
projects and the amount of money allocated. 
In Table 3 some preliminary descriptive statistics are shown. 
 
Table 3 – Exploratory data analysis. 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Range 
lnamounts_pc 4.3061 4.5545 1.7295 -0.4602 3.1263 9.4483 
lnpayments_pc 4.0135 4.1609 1.6979 -0.3040 2.9617 9.0586 
lncommitment_pc 4.2685 4.5367 1.7243 -0.4921 3.2440 9.5749 
Projects 2.5524 1 3.6953 5.5770 41.9537 35 
Votes 53.9711 54.0975 6.3680 -0.0132 4.3171 47.0650 
Nonprofits 25.1667 10 73.2106 6.5077 47.9020 656 
Province 0.0238 0 0.1528 6.2470 40.0244 1 
Health structures 0.4619 0 0.4997 0.1528 1.0234 1 
University 0.0762 0 0.2659 3.1949 11.2075 1 
Nursery 0.3048 0 0.4614 0.8483 1.7196 1 
Primary school 0.3238 0 0.4690 0.7531 1.5671 1 
Secondary school 0.8524 1 0.3556 -1.9868 4.9474 1 
Senior high school 0.3571 0 0.4803 0.5963 1.3556 1 
T&C 0.0762 0 0.2659 3.1949 11.2075 1 
Touristic attractors 0.2810 0 0.4505 0.9747 1.9501 1 
TV&R 0.1952 0 0.3973 1.5377 3.3646 1 
Soccer 0.0381 0 0.1919 4.8259 24.2896 1 
A&C&A 0.7381 1 0.4407 -1.0831 2.1730 1 
A&P 0.0524 0 0.2233 4.0182 17.1462 1 
L&P 0.4762 0 0.5006 0.0953 1.0091 1 
Museums 0.2048 0 0.4045 1.4633 3.1412 1 
Cultural Sites 0.1143 0 0.3189 2.4247 6.8790 1 
Criminal Hubs 0.2571 0 0.4381 1.1113 2.2350 1 
Councillor 0.0714 0 0.2582 3.3282 12.0769 1 
Sources: our calculations on POR (2009) and www.regionecalabria.it data. 
 
The tested projects – those of POR 2000-2006 Axes II as resulting 
from the regional Report of 29 February 2008 referring to end of 20079 
– were considered “non continuous” projects, which means they had a 
specific end date. This specification allowed for simplified testing and 
analysis. The data set is available on the official website of the Calabria 
Region in the Reports on POR 2000-2006 and is synthesized in Table 2 
and in various other Tables. Statistical analysis was conducted only for 
cross-section containing municipals that received POR funds. The focus 
on the amount per-capita in municipalities that received projects allows 
us to examine which priorities, if any, have been pursued in allocating 
the funds among them. We constructed a data set to analyze the relation-
                                                 
9 See: 
http://www.regione.calabria.it/calabriaeuropa/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=120&Itemi
d=253. 
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ship of the data about the projects in per capita amount for the various 
municipalities, and the variables described below regarding these munici-
palities. 
A variety of regression techniques were used. First, we ran a Stepwise 
regression, always concentrating on the per-capita amounts, i.e. on the 
municipalities that received funds10. 
Afterwards, we ran a GLM model11. In particular, these estimators 
permit us to estimate GLM-like models involving mean-variance specifi-
cations that extend beyond those for known exponential family distribu-
tions, and to estimate models where the mean-variance specification is of 
exponential family form, but the observed data do not satisfy the distri-
butional requirements (Agresti, 1990)12. 
As a third method of estimate, we choose a Robust regression13. Fi-
nally, we estimated a Quantile regression14. 
                                                 
10 Stepwise methods provide ways to automate the process of model selection. They 
work either by subtracting predictors from a complicated model, or by adding predic-
tors to a simpler one according to some pre-set statistical criteria. Stepwise methods 
cannot consider the substantive or theoretical implications of their choices, nor can 
they do much troubleshooting to evaluate possible weakness in the models produced at 
each step. They produce badly biased models in many instances due to over-fitting. De-
spite their well-known limitations, stepwise methods meet some practical needs and 
have been widely used. 
11 Nelder and McCullagh (1989) describe a class of Generalized Linear Models (GLMs) 
that extends linear regression to permit non-normal stochastic and non-linear systemat-
ic components. GLMs encompass a broad and empirically useful range of specifications 
that includes linear regression, logistic and probit analysis, and Poisson models. 
Crucially, the properties of the GLM maximum likelihood estimator depend only 
on these two moments. Thus, a GLM specification is principally a vehicle for specifying 
a mean and variance, where the mean is determined by the link assumption, and the 
mean-variance relationship is governed by the distributional assumption. In this respect, 
the distributional assumption of the standard GLM is overly restrictive. McCullagh 
(1983) offers a full set of distributional results for the quasi-maximum likelihood 
(QML) estimator that mirror those for ordinary maximum likelihood. 
12 Alternately, Gourioux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984) show that consistency of 
the GLM maximum likelihood estimator requires only correct specification of the con-
ditional mean. Misspecification of the variance relationship does, however, lead to 
invalid inference, though this may be corrected using robust coefficient covariance es-
timation. In contrast to the QML results, the robust covariance correction does not re-
quire correction specification of a GLM conditional variance. 
13 An Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares (IRLS) procedure obtains robust regression 
estimates. The first iteration begins with OLS. Any observations so influential as to 
have Cook’s distance D values greater than 1 are automatically set aside after this first 
step. Next, weights are calculated for each observation using a Huber function (which 
downweights observations that have larger residuals) and weighted least squares is per-
formed. After several WLS iterations, the weight function shifts to a Tukey biweight (as 
suggested by Li, 1985), tuned for 95% Gaussian efficiency (Street, Carroll, and Ruppert, 
1988; Hamilton 1992). 
14 As originally proposed by Koenker and Baxistt (1978), quantile regression pro-
vides estimates of the linear relationship between X regressors and a specified quantile 
of the dependent variable Y. One important special case of quantile regression is the 
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We choose the log-linear functional form, and our dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of per-capita amounts (lnamounts_pc), and it 
represents POR funds of each municipality, divided for its population. 
Projects is the number of approved projects; Votes is the electoral flows; 
Nonprofit is the number of nonprofit organizations of any kind in the giv-
en municipality; Province is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if munici-
pal is a Province, and equal to 0 otherwise; Health structures is a dummy 
variable, that is equal to 1 if in the municipal area insists at least one hos-
pital, nuthouse or fitness centre, and equal to 0 otherwise; University is a 
dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if in the municipal area there contains 
an academic institution, and equal to 0 otherwise; Nursery is a dummy va-
riable, that is equal to 1 if the municipality has got a nursery, and equal to 
0 otherwise; Primary school is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if in the 
municipal area there is at least one primary school, and equal to 0 other-
wise; Secondary school is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if in the mu-
nicipal area there is at least one secondary school, and equal to 0 other-
wise; Senior high school is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if in the mu-
nicipal area there is at least one senior high school, and equal to 0 other-
wise; T&C is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if in the municipal area 
there is at least one theatre or a cinema, and equal to 0 otherwise; Touris-
tic attractors is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if in the municipal area 
there is at least one disco, aquapark, wine-tasting shop, sport-centre, or a 
beach, and equal to 0 otherwise; TV&R is a dummy variable, that is 
equal to 1 if in the municipal area there is at least one local TV or radio 
station, and equal to 0 otherwise; Soccer is a dummy variable, that is equal 
to 1 if in the municipal area there is at least one professional soccer team, 
and equal to 0 otherwise; A&C&A is a dummy variable, that is equal to 
1 if in the municipal area there is at least one hotel, camping or farm hol-
idays, and equal to 0 otherwise; A&P is a dummy variable, that is equal 
to 1 if in the municipal area there is at least one airport or seaport, and 
equal to 0 otherwise; L&P is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if in 
the municipal area there is at least one library or local publisher, and 
equal to 0 otherwise; Museums is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if in 
the municipal area there is at least one museum, and equal to 0 other-
wise; Cultural Sites is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if the municipal-
ity might be considered as a cultural hub (see Table 1) and equal to 0 
otherwise; Criminal Hubs is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if the 
municipality might be considered as a criminal hub according to Gratteri 
and Nicaso (2007) classification, and equal to 0 otherwise (see Table 5) 
Councillor is a dummy variable, that is equal to 1 if the municipality has 
been represented by a councillor as a member of Regional Government 
during the period 2000-2006, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
                                                                                                                   
Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) estimator, which corresponds to fitting the conditional 
median of the response variable. 
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As is shown in Table 4, first of all one notices that there are very few 
differences in the estimated coefficients among four estimation methods 
applied. In fact, the coefficients are very similar, while standard errors 
present slight variations. The second column represents the output of 
Stepwise Backward Robust OLS estimate. Recall that we choose the log-
linear functional form, and our dependent variable is the natural loga-
rithm of per capita amounts (lnamounts_pc). In order to control for hete-
roscedasticity, we applied White’s correction. 
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Table 4 – Regression Analysis, POR-Calabria (2000-2006). 
Dependent 
Variable: 
(lnamounts_pc) 
Stepwise 
Backward 
Robust 
OLSa 
Robust 
GLMa 
IRLS LAD with 
bootstrapping 
Constant 3.4999*** 
(.1633) 
3.4999*** 
(.1606) 
3.4994*** 
(.1431) 
3.6130*** 
(.2058) 
Projects .2931*** 
(.0678) 
.2931*** 
(.0666) 
.3744*** 
(.0575) 
.3244*** 
(.0774) 
Nonprofit -.0131*** 
(.0029) 
-.0131*** 
(.0029) 
-.0132*** 
(.0025) 
-.0137*** 
(.0774) 
University .5930** 
(.2712) 
.5930** 
(.2666) 
  
Touristic 
Attractors 
-.4752*** 
(.1804) 
-.4752*** 
(.1773) 
-.4399** 
(.2002) 
 
L&P -.3128* 
(.1676) 
-.3128* 
(.1647) 
-.3705** 
(.1690) 
-.3607** 
(.1907) 
Senior high 
school 
-1.0574*** 
(.1911) 
-1.0574*** 
(.1879) 
-1.0791*** 
(.1893) 
-1.0711*** 
(.1840) 
Number of obs. 210 210 209 210 
F test 43.70 
(.0000) 
 45.19  
Log-Likelihood -321.0666    
Pearson 
Dispersion 
 1.295   
R2 .5874  .5731  
R2adj .5834  .5604  
Pseudo R2    .3385 
BIC 684.9101 -818.4658   
AIC 658.1332    
RMSE 1.1381  1.1462  
Ramsey OV test 2.03 
(.1107) 
   
Mean VIF 2.52    
Tolerance Ratio .3968    
Skewness-
Kurtosis test 
.98 
(.6129) 
0.98 
(.6129) 
9.46 
(.0088) 
3.30 
(.1920) 
Shapiro-Francia 
test 
(.6134) (.6134) (.0160) (.0486) 
Shapiro-Wilk 
test 
(.5947) (.5947) (.0246) (.0360) 
IQR 1 mild outlier 
0 severe out-
lier 
1 mild outlier 
0 severe out-
lier 
3 mild outliers 
0 severe out-
lier 
9 mild outliers 
0 severe outlier 
Link test f.v. significant 
(f.v.)2 not 
Significant 
f.v. significant 
(f.v.)2 not 
significant 
 f.v. significant 
(f.v.)2 not 
Significant 
Notes: a: White correction for heteroskedasticity applied. Significance levels: * 
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. 
 
About regression analysis, as expected, the number of total projects 
(Projects) is statistically significant, and this explanatory variable tends to 
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have a positive influence on per capita amounts of the individual muni-
cipalities. The presence of museums in the considered municipalities is 
not relevant for the allocation of per capita funds, nor are the presence 
of important cultural sites relevant. Also the presence of schools – 
whether of primary or secondary education – does not seem relevant, 
whilst the presence of senior high schools is relevant with a negative im-
pact. It appears that in municipalities where there are already important 
public cultural institutions no attention is required in terms of the alloca-
tion of POR’ s funds for culture. A similar consideration may explain the 
L&P’s negative influence on the allocation of these funds. Touristic attrac-
tors tend to have a negative impact on dependent variable, too; the reason 
could be the different kind of tourism that the attractors stimulate. On 
the other hand one should notice that they are not significant in the 
LAD estimate. The variables TV&R, A&C&A and A&P, which too 
may be relevant for tourism, are not significant. On balance, one can ar-
gue that the presence of relevant tourist facilities and services does not 
exert an appreciable influence on the allocation of the Calabrian POR’s 
funds for culture, even if the development of tourism is among the offi-
cial objectives of the program. Yet, the presence of an academic institu-
tion (University) increase the funds assigned. This result might provide 
evidence in support of the idea that where there is a University, the ca-
pability of presenting projects to be approved tends to increase – possi-
bly due to the greater competence and intellectual prestige of the authors 
advocating the project, or their capabilities in lobbying procedures. On 
the other hand, one can notice that in LAD estimate University is not sig-
nificant and that in IRLS estimate the explanatory variable University 
doesn’t have a statistical relevance. This result implies that the presence 
of an University in a given town it is not important in the policy of the 
Region as for the allocation of the POR’s cultural funds. As previously 
seen, there is a strong correlation between the presence of nonprofit or-
ganizations and the allocation of funds to the municipalities. So, those 
with nonprofit institutions have been favored on those without them. 
However, the variable Nonprofit shows a negative incidence on the per 
capita amounts for municipalities which received funds. One can explain 
this result arguing that the competition among the different nonprofit 
organizations for these public funds reduced the success of them. 
 
6. Regression results: a comment 
According to the diagnostic checks, the goodness-of-fit is acceptable (the 
coefficient of determination and the adjusted coefficient both are 
>56%), while the F-stat reveals that set of independent variables (jointly 
considered) significantly differs from zero, since we strongly reject the 
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null hypothesis. 
Ramsey’ RESET test controls whether non-linear combinations of 
the estimated values help explain the endogenous variable (Ramsey, 
1969). The intuition behind the test is that, if non-linear combinations of 
the explanatory variables have any power in explaining the endogenous 
variable, then the model is mis-specified. Since we don’t reject the null 
hypothesis that the model has no omitted variables, we might conclude 
that it is well-specified. 
The mean Variance Inflation Factor is equal to 2.52. VIF gives a 
quick check for multicollinearity. 1/VIF tells us what proportion of an 
explanatory variable’s variance is independent of all the other X va-
riables. A low proportion indicates potential trouble. VIF values provide 
guidance but not direct measurements of the increase in coefficient va-
riances. Nevertheless, Chatterjee and Hadi (2006) suggest a sort of “rule 
of thumb”: if the mean VIF is considerably larger than 1, we could sus-
pect the presence of multicollinearity. With our mean VIF less than 3, 
and our largest VIF close to 5.5, our regression clearly doesn’t meet both 
criteria. Moreover, the tolerance statistics is >0.2, so there is not a multi-
collinearity problem (Menard, 1995). 
 
Table 5 – Pairwise correlation matrix for our statistically relevant variables. 
Variable lnamounts_pc Projects Nonprofit University Touristic 
Attractors 
L&P Senior 
high 
school 
lnamounts_pc 1       
Projects 0.2138 1      
Nonprofit 0.0084 0.8890 1     
University 0.0274 0.5461 0.5995 1    
Touristic 
Attractors 
-0.1156 0.3231 0.3474 0.3396 1   
L&P -0.0818 0.2270 0.2422 0.2653 0.2313 1  
Senior high 
school 
-0.2385 0.3304 0.3255 0.3104 0.3964 0.2843 1 
Note: Bonferroni correction applied. 
Source: our calculations on POR (2009) and www.regionecalabria.it data. 
 
As the Table 5 above shows, there is only a high correlation coeffi-
cient between Projects and Nonprofit (r=0.8890); the reason for this lies on 
the fact that municipalities with a great number of nonprofit organiza-
tions tend to elaborate a higher number of projects. Moreover, any other 
pairwise correlation value is below 0.6. This could also explain the ab-
sence of multicollinearity in our regression equation. 
Moreover, the pairwise correlation coefficients matrix patently shows 
us that – either we use Bonferroni-adjusted significance level or Sidak-
adjusted significance level – there exists only a troublesome correlation 
between amounts and payments, but that this collinearity doesn’t distort 
very deeply our estimate (Abdi, 2007). 
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Yet, if our model is really well-specified, then if we were to regress 
lnamounts_pc on the prediction and the prediction squared, the prediction 
squared would have no explanatory power. This is what linktest does 
(Tukey, 1949; Pregibon, 1979). We find that the prediction squared does 
have explanatory power, so our specification is not as good as we 
thought. Although linktest is formally a test of the specification of the 
dependent variable, it is often interpreted as a test that, conditional on 
the specification, the independent variables are specified incorrectly. 
Finally, we analyze the normality of residuals. We conducted three 
different test to check the Gaussian distribution of residuals: Jarque and 
Bera test (1987), Shapiro and Wilk test (1965), Shapiro and Francia test 
(1972). Since all these tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of normality, 
we are able to conclude in favour of normality assumption. 
 
7. Criminal hubs 
In this section we discuss the relevance on Criminal Hubs on POR funds 
allocation. Moreover, we show some statistical analysis on these organi-
zations. 
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Table 6 – Criminal Hubs (Calabria). 
Municipality Populations Cultural 
sites 
Non-
profit 
Projects Payments Commitments 
Africo (RC) 3,465 0 18 0 0 0 
Amantea (CS) 13,268 0 30 3 516,377.36 814,370.28 
Bagnara Calabra (RC) 11,230 0 34 1 95,220.11 95,220.11 
Bianco (RC) 4,047 0 16 0 0 0 
Botricello (CZ) 4,586 0 7 0 0 0 
Bova Marina (RC) 3,967 0 23 6 3,676,273.3 5,273,978.4 
Bova (RC) 474 0 6 9 2,817,149.8 4,720,996.4 
Bovalino (RC) 8,358 0 39 4 465,166.55 1,099,912.5 
Bruzzano Zeffirio (RC) 1,401 0 3 0 0 0 
Careri (RC) 2,443 0 4 0 0 0 
Casignana (RC) 775 0 3 2 2,710,353.5 2,710,353.5 
Cassano allo Ionio (CS) 17,565 2 37 8 4,130,568.3 4,505,924.3 
Castrovillari (CS) 22,389 0 78 3 169,995.97 190,975.97 
Catanzaro (CZ) 95,251 0 535 35 10,128,753 12,005,666 
Cetraro (CS) 10,333 0 19 1 14,999.59 14,999.59 
Cirò Marina (KR) 13,987 0 26 0 0 0 
Cittanova (RC) 10,675 0 27 0 0 0 
Condofuri (RC) 5,055 0 6 4 174,792.94 761,156.57 
Corigliano Calabro (CS) 38,241 1 71 6 954,893.58 1,258,881.3 
Cosenza (CS) 72,998 2 477 18 10,858,300 15,067,260 
Crotone (KR) 60,010 2 384 14 10,998,600 11,095,193 
Cutro (KR) 10,829 0 11 1 10,000 10,000 
Filadelfia (VV) 6,283 0 15 1 10,000 10,000 
Fuscaldo (CS) 8,323 0 25 2 639,647.39 681,497.48 
Galatro (RC) 2,307 0 2 0 0 0 
Gioia Tauro (RC) 17,762 0 55 3 879,815.33 1,117,466.6 
Gioiosa Ionica (RC) 7,044 0 21 3 205,452.7 205,452.71 
Guardavalle (CZ) 5,315 0 7 1 495,102.38 495,102.38 
Lamezia Terme (CZ) 70,501 1 228 12 6,854,918.8 7,299,960.3 
Laureana di Borrello (RC) 5,709 0 13 0 0 0 
Limbadi (VV) 3,630 0 4 0 0 0 
Locri (RC) 12,997 3 65 8 3,465,832.6 4,476,272.1 
Mammola (RC) 3,389 0 8 2 651,763.48 707,760.02 
Marina di Gioiosa 
Ionica (RC) 
6,440 0 19 1 6,000 6,000 
Melicucco (RC) 4,996 0 13 0 0 0 
Melito di Porto Salvo (RC) 10,506 0 39 5 1,001,660.8 1,603,608.3 
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Mesoraca (KR) 7,125 0 20 2 51,666.67 93,333.33 
Mileto (VV) 7,157 1 33 2 324,767.58 339,501.24 
Monasterace (RC) 3,426 1 16 1 282,436.79 300,000 
Montebello Ionico (RC) 6,922 0 16 0 0 0 
Oppido Mamertina (RC) 5,559 0 23 4 2,091,343.2 3,613,740.6 
Palizzi (RC) 2,709 0 12 1 474,225.96 610,000 
Palmi (RC) 19,435 1 45 5 2,356,504.3 3,847,090.1 
Paola (CS) 17,195 0 51 4 177,080.93 338,300.98 
Petilia Policastro (KR) 9,594 0 28 1 20,000 20,000 
Petronà (CZ) 3,010 0 5 0 0 0 
Platì (RC) 3,823 0 15 0 0 0 
Polistena (RC) 11,591 0 30 4 277,664.95 747,215.03 
Reggio di Calabria (RC) 180,353 3 656 28 6,757,632.4 7,950,883.4 
Rizziconi (RC) 7,650 0 25 0 0 0 
Rocca di Neto (KR) 5,614 0 13 0 0 0 
Roccella Ionica (RC) 6,762 0 33 4 5,988,575.9 6,066,275.9 
Roghudi (RC) 1,365 0 0 1 220,414.71 494,000 
Rosarno (RC) 15,051 0 15 3 485,869.57 1,253,928 
San Ferdinando (RC) 4,339 0 11 1 90,000 90,000 
San Gregorio d’Ippona (VV) 2,338 0 4 2 373,780.09 373,780.09 
San Lorenzo (RC) 3,357 0 8 2 518,201.77 908,805.1 
San Luca (RC) 4,106 0 7 1 416,165.48 416,165.48 
San Lucido (CS) 5,906 0 16 1 14,997.28 15,000 
Seminara (RC) 3,352 0 12 1 452,021.35 463,480 
Serra San Bruno (VV) 7,068 1 18 4 371,409.61 1,759,943.8 
Siderno (RC) 1,6734 0 34 2 0 55,000 
Sinopoli (RC) 2,329 0 3 1 134,797.34 22,5000 
Soriano Calabro (VV) 3,068 0 14 2 319,896.86 319,896.86 
Staiti (RC) 395 0 3 1 254,919.87 377,000 
Stignano (RC) 1,373 0 1 0 0 0 
Stilo (RC) 2,816 1 7 1 49,724.21 1,250,000 
Strongoli (KR) 6,107 0 9 3 424,873.16 1,676,234.4 
Taurianova (RC) 15,799 0 30 0 0 0 
Vibo Valentia (VV) 33,957 2 155 12 5,292,731.9 5,526,586.2 
Villa San Giovanni (RC) 13,119 0 53 3 136,841.17 136,841.17 
Zungri (VV) 2,182 0 5 2 216,402.33 310,744.11 
Total 1,019,235 21 3,794 252 90,506,584 115,806,753 
Source: Gratteri and Nicaso (2007) for the list of criminal hubs and POR (2009) for 
the data. 
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A different consideration may be offered for criminal hubs. They 
have been preferred over the other municipalities beneficiaries of 
projects not only for the total amount allocated to them, but also for the 
per capita allocation of the funds and the amount of funding per project. 
The difference of this result with that relating to nonprofits may be ex-
plained considering that these criminal organizations are oligopolistic 
groups, not very numerous, so only a small and imperfect competition 
exists when compared with most of the Calabria’s nonprofits. 
 
Table 7 – Amounts, Payments and Commitment for Calabrian municipalities 
that received POR funds (Averages for municipalities). 
Variable With 
Criminal 
Hubs 
Without 
Criminal 
Hubs 
All 
Municipalities 
Amounts 2,312,680 549,135.5 1,002,618 
Payments 1,676,048 427,097.2 748,256 
Commitments 2,144,570 523,041.6 940,005.9 
Amounts per capita 446.3187 200.687 263.8494 
Payments per capita 293.7673 157.5825 192.6015 
Commitments per capita 423.4145 192.3203 251.7445 
Notes: total number of projects: 539; total number municipalities with approved 
projects: 210. 
Source: our calculations on POR (2009) and Gratteri and Nicaso (2007) data. 
 
So, we have 539 total projects, distributed as follows: 
 426 to Measure 2.1 (=79.04%) 
 40 to Measure 2.2 (=7.42%) 
 73 to Measure 2.3 (=13.54%). 
 
As part of the total projects: 
 252 to Municipalities with Criminal Hubs (=46.75%) 
 287 projects to Municipalities without Criminal Hubs (=53.25%). 
 
Projects assigned to Criminal hubs as part of a single Measure: 
 191 projects of Measure 2.1 (=44.84%) 
 20 projects of Measure 2.2 (=50.00%) 
 41 projects of Measure 2.3 (=56.16%). 
 
As Table 7 above shows, per capita payments to criminal hubs are 
86% greater than those of the non criminal hubs, and the per capita 
commitments for the criminal hubs are 220% greater than those for the 
non criminal hubs. Municipalities that are criminal hubs received an av-
erage of 2,312,680 Euro, while municipalities that aren’t criminal hubs 
received an average amount of 549,000 Euro (i.e. about 24% of the for-
mer). For commitments, the ratio is lower 20%. Clearly, they were less 
able to obtain the commitment of the allocated sums to their projects. 
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For payments, the ratio is about 25%. The reason of this difference lies 
in the higher ratio of the payments to the commitments for the projects 
of the municipalities that aren’t criminal hubs. Indeed, the projects of 
Measure 2.1 and 2.3 – that require an investment of money by the bene-
ficiaries of the sums committed for the projects – they may maximize 
their gains and their employment of manpower by non completing the 
projects. As for the first stage, they may present their expenses as the 
cost of the project, and the expense for the machinery that they already 
own, as well as for the wages of the activities that require a lot of man-
power and a minimum of materials. Then they may abandon the 
projects, because they may not really be interested in the concrete results. 
It is also interesting to observe that criminal hubs have a larger share of 
the project in Measure 2.2 (which does not require a counter-part by the 
principals of the projects and consists in services, i.e. in employment) 
and in Measure 2.3, which consists in projects by private enterprises for 
the valorization of the cultural goods, in which the labor component 
might also be quite important. 
The projects executed in the criminal hubs, as Table 7 clarifies, were 
252. Each project, on average, therefore got 456,000 Euro. However, the 
total amount spent for the 252 projects allocated to the criminal hubs 
(see Table 7) was 90,500,000 Euro. Therefore, in criminal hubs each 
project, on average, received 359,000 Euro. Clearly, criminal hubs were 
able to get more from this POR, not only per municipality, but also per 
project. 
 
8. Impact of Calabria’s POR projects for culture on cultural sites 
and on tourism 
POR funds for cultural investments finalized to develop tourism, as the 
statistical analysis has shown, have been mostly dispersed to purposes 
different from the valorization of the important cultural sites of the re-
gion, without any consideration of priorities. This POR might have even 
harmed the promotion of Calabria’s cultural sites, because the unfinished 
projects are of a high percentage. Moreover, the Central government 
budget may have overlooked Calabria’s cultural sites, assuming that they 
would be taken care of by the special budget of POR (see Table 8). 
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Table 8 – Visitors of museums and revenues for Calabria and Italy (2000-2007). 
 
Visitors in 
2000 
Visitors in 
2007 
% Change 
2007/2000 
Revenues 
2000 
Revenues 
2007 
% Change 
2007/2000 
Calabrian Museums 238,937 212,130 -11.0% 322,602 270,696 -15.8% 
Italian Museums 10,873,054 10,727,703 -1.0% 33,383,807 31,384,733 -6.0% 
Calabrian 
Archeological Sites 139,639 87,696 -37.0% 0 0 0.0% 
Italian 
Archeological Sites 16,856,112 16,363,057 -3.0% 28,245,726 34,237,406 21.2% 
Calabrian Museums 
and Monuments 378,576 299,826 -21.0% 322,602 270,696 -16.1% 
Italian Museums 
and Monuments 30,175,826 34,443,097 14.1% 77,017,081 106,033,174 37.7% 
Source: MIBAC and SISTAN data. 
 
The lack of tourist development of the archaeological sites in comparison to the Italian 
Calabria 
 
Despite the importance of the sites of high archaeological value, their 
value through funding of the POR Calabria did not receive money, as 
they were and still are, free of admission fees. But the phenomenon is 
more dramatic since 2000, the start of the POR, when visitors to the 
sites decreased dramatically from 140,000 in 2000 to 88,000 in 2007. As 
for the Italian archaeological sites, in 2000 they attracted 17 million visi-
tors with revenues of 28 million Euro. In 2007 the number of visitors 
fell to 16 million – a decrease of 3%. Despite this slight decline in visi-
tors, revenues increased significantly, from 28 million Euro in 2000 to 34 
million in 2007 – with a significant increase of 21%. 
 
The unsatisfactory situation of the touristic valorization of Calabrian museums in 
comparison to the Italian ones 
 
The situation of museums in Calabria is not rosy. In 2000 the number of 
visitors to Calabrian museums was of 238,000, and it fell to 212,000 in 
2007 – a drop of 11%. The revenues declined from 322,000 in 2000 to 
271,000 in 2007 – 16% decrease. This is comparable the Italian archaeo-
logical sites, which have seen their revenues increase by 21%, whilst the 
number of visitors to these sites fell by 6%. 
 
Visitors and revenues to Italian museums and monuments 
 
In 2000, visitors to Italian museums and monuments  were approximate-
ly 30 million with a revenue of 77 million Euro. In 2007, Italian mu-
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seums and monuments attracted 34,443,097 visitors and produced gross 
revenues of 106 million Euro. There is an increase in the flows of visi-
tors since 2000 of about 13% for the visitors and of more than 38% for 
the revenues. For the archeological sites at the national level, 2007 wit-
nessed a decrease in visitor numbers of about 6% when compared with 
the number of visitors in 2000. The amount of revenues of such sites in-
creased by 21%, from 28.2 million in 2000 to 34.2 million Euro in 2007. 
The coexistence of these two divergent trends between Calabria and 
Italy shows that the POR for the culture of Calabria missed the objective 
of attracting new visitors to Calabria’s important cultural sites. 
Furthermore the objective of connecting Calabria’s archeological sites 
into a unique system - which appears among the objectives of the POR - 
has not been realized. 
 
Tourism in Calabria and in Italy 
 
On the other hand, tourism in Calabria between year 2000 and 2007 has 
experienced a great increase of arrivals (nearly 45%) and presences (near-
ly 39%), with a spectacular increase in those of the number of foreigners. 
Arrivals of the foreigners in this period increased by 78.3% more than 
the double the increase in Italians whose numbers increased by 40% (see 
Table 9). 
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Table 9 – Tourist’s flows in Calabria and in Italy (2000-2007). 
Presences 
Italians/Foreigners 2000 2006 
% Change 
2006/2000 2007 
% Change 
2007/2000 
ITALIA 338,885,143 366,764,778 8% 376,641,751 11% 
CALABRIA 6,282,074 8,155,053 30% 8,731,335 39% 
Presences 
Foreigners 2000 2006 
% Change 
2006/2000 2007 
% Change 
2007/2000 
ITALIA 140,356,985 156,861,341 12% 163,465,680 16% 
CALABRIA 882,837 1,479,247 68% 1,542,133 74% 
Arrivals 
Italians/Foreigners 2000 2006 
% Change 
2006/2000 2007 
% Change 
2007/2000 
ITALIA 80,031,637 93,044,399 16% 96,150,083 20% 
CALABRIA 1,083,078 1,476,026 36% 1,568,519 45% 
Arrivals Italians 2000 2006 
% Change 
2006/2000 2007 
% Change 
2007/2000 
ITALIA 44,924,162 51,850,572 15% 53,276,961 19% 
CALABRIA 946,977 1,244,549 31% 1,325,825 40% 
Arrivals 
Foreigners 2000 2006 
% Change 
2006/2000 2007 
% Change 
2007/2000 
ITALIA 35,107,475 41,193,827 17% 42,873,122 22% 
CALABRIA 136,101 231,477 70% 242,694 78% 
Source: ISTAT. 
 
The Italian trend too has been positive but has been much less pro-
nounced than that of Calabria both for the arrivals and the presence, 
both of the foreigners and of the Italians. Arrivals, in Italy as a whole, 
had an increase of 20.4%, less than half the rise of Calabria’s. Presence 
of tourists increased by 11.1% ,.i.e. less than one third of the increase 
witnessed in Calabria. The arrival of foreigners, in Italy as a whole, in the 
considered period increased by 20%, about a quarter of Calabria’s per-
centage, whilst the arrivals of Italians increase by 18.6%, slightly less than 
half Calabria’s rise. Considering that in the same period the number of 
visitors to the Calabria’s cultural sites diminished substantially one can 
argue that the great increase in the flow of tourists – and particularly of 
foreign tourists – to Calabria was due to reasons not associated with the 
attractiveness of its cultural sites. Additionally, Calabria’s POR 2000-
2006 which had been conceived for the enhancement of cultural sites as 
an important factor for the development of tourism, has been irrelevant 
or negative from this point of view. 
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9. Coherent projects 
Only a part of the available funds of Calabria’s POR 2000-2006 was 
spent on programs. The remaining part was destined to other regional 
expenditures which could be considered coherent with the POR, thus 
increasing the funds available to the Region for its ordinary administra-
tion. 
This result coincides with those of the other Italian Regions which 
benefitted from Objective 1 of the European Regional Programs 2000-
2006. 
 
Table 10 – Italian European Regional Program 2000-2006 Coherent Projects. 
Axis Absolute 
Values 
(mln €) 
% Financial 
Endowment 
% Identified 
Projects 
Natural Resources 4,173 54.5 38.9 
Cultural Resources 794 31.5 26.6 
Human Resources 1,542 18.6 15.8 
Local Development Systems 4,092 27.7 22.4 
Towns 1,433 70.2 44.6 
Infrastructural Investments 8,377 85.7 64.0 
Technical Assistance 23 2.6 2.5 
Total 20,434 44.5 34.7 
Source: Svimez (2010). 
 
Indeed only 55.5% of the 45.9 billion Euro allocated for this program 
was spent on projects (see Table 10). The remaining 44.5% was allocated 
to coherent projects. They represent a share of 34.7% of the value of the 
approved projects. The difference between the percentage of the value 
of the approved projects and the higher percentage of coherent projects 
– relative to the total executed projects – is explained by the fact that a 
share of the project approved remained unfinished, so that the value of 
the projects executed was smaller15. 
 
                                                 
15 The analysis of the composition of the funds allocate to coherent project instead 
than to the European Regional Program for Sothern Italy shows that the highest per-
centage regards infrastructures and natural resources (mostly agriculture). The lowest 
percentage regards human resources and local systems. Clearly in these last areas the 
pressure groups minimized the amount of funds unspent out of the European Devel-
opment Programs. 
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10. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
Most research on the effectiveness of the European Regional Programs 
for the convergence of less developed regions analyze the issue by con-
necting the execution of these programs to the economic performance 
of these regions. These researches, generally, conclude that the programs 
did not have satisfactory results, from the perspective of growth, except 
in particular cases. These studies, however interesting, are mostly ma-
croeconomic studies. They do not focus on the institutions and proce-
dures, and related performance of these plans in the context of the re-
sulting projects. Here we consider the European-Italian process which 
has been originated and implemented under the Regional Operational 
Program of Calabria 2000-2006, in the area of valorization of cultural 
goods for the development of tourism. We have demonstrated that its 
complex targeted structure, with its apparent rigorousness, allowed for 
discretionary behavior of politicians and of the bureaucracy in charge of 
its execution. The result was a proliferation of projects that did not pur-
sue any priority and that in a large proportion remained incomplete. 
Our empirical analysis for Calabria’s case study has shown that mostly 
reasons connected with pressure groups, rather than cultural and touris-
tic objectives explain the allocation of the funds. There is no significant 
statistic relationship between the important cultural sites and the alloca-
tion of funds. Furthermore, the regression with the approved project has 
shown that the presence of at least one museum is not significant, as for 
the allocation of per capita funds to the municipalities. Also the presence 
of schools – whether of primary or secondary education – does not seem 
relevant, while the presence of high schools is relevant with a negative 
impact. It seems that because in these municipalities there are already 
some important public cultural institutions, they do not need attention as 
for the allocation of POR’ s funds for culture. A similar consideration 
may explain the L&P’s (libraries and publishers) negative influence on 
the allocation of these funds. The presence of an academic institution 
(University) increase the funds assigned. This result might provide evi-
dence that where there is a University, the capability of presenting 
projects suited for approval tends to increase, likely because of the great-
er competence and intellectual prestige of their authors. On the other 
hand, one can notice that in LAD estimate University is not significant 
and that in IRLS estimate the explanatory variable University doesn’t have 
a statistical relevance. Touristic attractors tend to have a negative impact 
on dependent variable, too. Moreover, one should notice that they are 
not significant in LAD estimate. The variables A&C&A (hotels, camp-
ing, farm-holidays), TV&R (television and radio stations), and A&P 
(aero-terminals and ports) which are relevant for tourism, are not statisti-
cally significant yet. On balance, one can argue that cultural goods as at-
tractors of tourism were neglected in the allocation of Calabria’s POR 
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funds for culture. However, this had been possible because the program 
allowed discretionary powers to be granted to the regional bureaucracies 
and politicians. But one cannot put the blame primarily on them, since 
Calabria’s POR was constructed in that way following the European and 
Italian guidelines and had the approval of the Italian Government and of 
the European Commission. 
Considering the flows of visitors and flows of money paid by them to 
the cultural sites in 2000 when the program was not yet operational and 
in 2007 after its completion and it emerged that these flows, as for the 
museum and other sites considered in the official statistics decreased by 
11% in terms of visitors and by 16% in terms of revenues. The opposite 
happened in Italy, with an increase of about 14% in the number of visi-
tors and nearly 30% in the amount of revenues. On the other hand, tour-
ism in Calabria between 2000 and 2007 experienced a great increase of 
both arrivals (nearly 45%) and presences (nearly 39%), with a relevant 
increase of 78.3% in the foreign tourists. Calabria’s tourism thus grew at 
a rate much greater than the average Italian rate, in spite of the failure of 
the POR for culture to operate as a stimulus for its growth. And one 
may, therefore, argue that the taxpayer s’ resources were wasted. 
11. Suggestions for future researches 
Here we considered the institutions and effects of the European Policy 
for the development of the less developed regions via the Regional 
funds, focusing on Calabria’s cultural sector and its impact on tourism, 
which is potentially a very important axis for the development of Cala-
bria and, more generally, for Southern Italy. What emerged was that the 
excess of targeted planning allowed a discretionary behavior of the bu-
reaucracy and of the politicians who were inefficient, demonstrated a 
lack of effectiveness, and fostered rent seeking. 
More generally, there is a strong need for further detailed scientific re-
search on the allocation and impact of European Structural Funds, also 
in relation to the new convergence and cohesion Program 2007-2013. It 
is paradoxical that on the one hand EU maintains that tax exemptions 
for the less developed regions economy of the community distort market 
competition, while on the other hand, the EU taxpayers’ money finances 
projects supposedly promoting convergence and cohesion in these re-
gions provided that they derive from a regional plan following EU plan-
ning guidelines. 
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